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FROM "FOOD FOR THOUGHT" TO
"EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE" ABOUT
CONSEQUENCES OF
LANDLORD-TENANT LAWS
Wemer Z Hirscht
Professor Rabin has given us an admirable synopsis of changes in
residential landlord-tenant laws, particularly since the 1969 Javi'ns
landmark decision. Becoming, in turn, sociologist, political scientist,
and social commentator in order to identify and trace the forces which
brought about these changes in legal doctrine, his efforts are informa-
tive. They are not, however, as profound as his inquiry into the nature
of doctrinal changes. When Professor Rabin approaches the third part
of his paper and attempts to investigate the effects the changes in resi-
dential landlord-tenant law have brought about, he suggests that
"[s]cholars have written enough in legal periodicals and in general works
to furnish food for thought."' By providing information on the work of
economists, I hope to go from "food for thought" to more robust evi-
dence, whether as the result of deductive reasoning, empirical research,
or both. I will offer, therefore, some deductive reasoning together with
empirical evidence about some major effects of two laws. Specifically, I
will consider the effect of extending the implied warranty of habitability
and of rent control laws on the welfare of indigent tenants and on secu-
lar changes in housing quality. Deductive and inductive research results
that appear quite convincing also exist for self-help remedies to obtain
possession and for certain antidiscrimination laws. Shortage of space,
however, will not permit me to review these studies.
I
HABITABILITY LAWS
A. Welfare Effects
Economists have developed a framework within which they can ex-
amine welfare effects of the extension of the implied warranty of habita-
bility.2 The framework makes use of a rental housing demand and
t Professor of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles.
I Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69
CORNELL L. REv. 517, 558 n.219 (1984).
2 Hirsch, Habitability Laws and the Welfare of Indigent Tenants, 61 REV. OF EcON. & STA-
TISTIcS 263 (1981).
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supply system, where the rental housing demand function gives expres-
sion to the evaluation tenants place on quantities of housing services.
Thus, to the extent that the presence of a habitability law leads to an
upward shift of the demand function, the value tenants place on their
apartments has increased, and vice versa. But these increases in housing
quality are not costless, because resources must be invested to satisfy
habitability laws. Thus, in the presence of habitability laws, rental
housing supply functions are also likely to shift upward. The question is
whether the increase in housing costs, as indicated by the outward shift
of the supply function, is greater or less than the increased valuation by
tenants of their apartments, as represented by the outward shift of the
demand function.
Estimating a rental housing demand and supply function is facili-
tated by the hedonic housing price approach, which helps estimate
shadow rental housing prices and quantities. Such an estimation is nec-
essary, because in real life we do not find information on the prices and
quantities of housing services. Instead, all we find is information on
rental prices and numbers of dwellings. This approach permits us to
estimate hedonic rental housing prices by measuring the distinctive
characteristics of a dwelling and expressing these characteristics as a sin-
gle quantity that reflects the market's consensus about their relative im-
portance. The larger this quantity, that is, the larger the flow of housing
service units associated with a given dwelling, the higher the quality.
For example, landlords that comply with habitability laws and invest in
repair and maintenance tend to provide larger quantities of housing
services and, therefore, better housing quality. The hedonic approach
views rent as the value of a dwelling that stems from the quantity char-
acteristics-housing service units-and their prices. Once hedonic hous-
ing service prices (shadow prices) are obtained in this manner, they can
be divided into readily available rents to obtain estimates of shadow
housing service quantities. These prices and quantity estimates can then
be used to estimate rental housing demand and supply functions.
After demand and supply functions and their shifts have been
econometrically estimated, it becomes possible to compare the relative
shift of the two functions and to make welfare statements. If, for exam-
ple, a significantly larger upward shift were found to occur in the de-
mand function associated with the presence of a given habitability law
than in the supply function, one could assert that the valuation by rent-
ers of improved housing exceeded the accompanying rent increases, and
vice versa.
The welfare analysis can be enriched by making use of the concept
of consumer's surplus, the gap between total utility and total market
value. The consumer gets a surplus because he receives more than he
pays for. This is the area below a demand function. Chart I shows that
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the consumer surplus analysis can be carried out with point C, the equi-
librium in the presence of a habitability law, here a receivership law,
and point E, the equilibrium in the absence of any law. The consumer
surplus is the area under the demand equation, bounded by the equilib-
rium price level from below and the vertical axis on the left. In this
instance, in the absence of a receivership law, the consumer's surplus is
area AEF; in its presence, area BCG. The change of the consumer sur-
plus due to the law is the difference between areas ABCD and DEFG
CHART I
COMPARISON OF CHANGE IN CONSUMER'S SURPLUS WITH
THE PRESENCE OF A RECEIVERSHIP LAW
(not drawn to scale)
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In a national study of seventy regions with more than one-fourth of
the U.S. population, only receivership laws significantly affected the de-
mand and supply functions of low income tenants.3 Repair and deduct,
as well as withholding, laws do not have statistically significant effects
on indigent tenants. The effect of receivership law on the supply shift,
however, was about three and one-half times as great as the effect on the
demand shift, and this difference was statistically significant. Thus, to
the extent that legislators design habitability laws to improve the wel-
fare of indigent tenants, they appear to have failed. Indeed, the laws
even may have been counterproductive.
3 Id at 272.
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Before concluding that habitability laws are apparently counter-
productive insofar as indigent tenants are concerned, it is useful to look
more closely at two particular classes of indigent tenants--senior citizens
and blacks. When data on senior citizens and black tenants are placed
into the demand and supply system discussed above, it appears that
habitability laws affect the two groups differently. Specifically, in rela-
tion to indigent aged tenants, only receivership laws have a statistically
significant effect on both the rental housing demand and supply func-
tions. The effect of that law on the demand function, however, was
about equal to that on the supply function: a 9.3% versus an 8.6% up-
ward shift.4
These econometric findings suggest that insofar as indigent aged
tenants are concerned, habitability laws are not counterproductive.
They enhance the evaluation of these tenants so that it will at least
equal and possibly somewhat exceed the increased rent they are forced
to pay.
The picture is very different, however, in relation to indigent black
tenants. In relation to this class of tenants, the findings closely approxi-
mate those obtained in relation to all indigent tenants. Again, only re-
ceivership laws had statistically significant effects on both the demand
and supply functions. The net regression coefficient of the supply func-
tion was 0.238 and the t value 2.89, indicating a statistical significance
at a 1% significance level using a one-tailed test.5 The corresponding net
regression coefficient of the demand function is 0.069 and the t value
1.45, indicating a statistical significance at a 10% level using a one-tailed
test. Moreover, the upward shift of the supply function is three and one-
half times as large as that of the demand function and the difference is
statistically significant.
How can we explain the difference in welfare effect of habitability
laws on indigent aged tenants and on indigent black tenants? One ex-
planation is that, from the point of view of landlords, aged tenants pose
distinctly fewer problems than black, particularly young black, tenants.
Specifically, senior citizens tend to stay in the same apartment for a
longer period than do blacks, and this greatly reduces the maintenance
costs to landlords. Whenever a tenant vacates a facility, landlords usu-
ally have to paint the unit, clean carpets, and make any necessary re-
pairs. Senior citizens as a class may also be perceived by landlords to be
less destructive to property, less noisy, and less litigious.
4 Hirsch, Effects of Habitability and Anti-speedy Eviction Laws on Black and Aged
Indigent Tenant Groups: An Economic Analysis, (Working Paper, UCLA Dep't of Econom-
ics 1982).
5 Id at 22-23.
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B. Effects on Housing Stock Quality
What effect, if any, do habitability laws have on the quality of the
rental housing stock? Because housing quality changes can be measured
using various definitions of "substandard housing," we will use four dif-
ferent definitions. We will use L, to define substandard rental units as
those that were classified as dilapidated in 1960. In relation to the pe-
riod 1960 to 1975, L, is positive in thirty-two out of thirty-nine Stan-
dard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs), with 3.4% the mean and
2.78 the standard deviation, indicating that rental housing deteriorated
between 1960 and 1974-75 by an average of 3.4%.
Variable L2 combines renter-occupied dilapidated units with
renter-occupied deteriorating units lacking some or all facilities. Using
this expanded definition of substandard rental housing in 1960, observa-
tions of L2 in nineteen SMSAs are negative and twenty positive, with
the mean -1.43% and the standard deviation 5.04, indicating an in-
crease in the quality of rental housing between 1960 and 1975 of 1.43%.
L3 offers the broadest definition of low-quality rental housing. Spe-
cifically, low-quality rental housing in 1960 is here defined as the sum of
units listed as dilapidated and those listed as deteriorating, whether or
not they have plumbing facilities. The observations in all but one
SMSA are negative and show an increase in quality, with the mean
-12.4% and the standard deviation 6.4.
L4 provides consistency in definition, because in both periods sub-
standard housing units are those rental units that lack some or all
plumbing facilities. All thirty-nine SMSAs show an increase in housing
quality. The mean value is -17.0% and the standard deviation is 10.6.
Thus, except when using the narrow definition of L1, there was sub-
stantial shrinkage in substandard housing between 1960 and 1975. As
expected, the broader the definition of substandard housing in 1960, the
greater the improvement. Under the consistent definition of substan-
dard housing as having no plumbing facilities, however, housing also
shows large improvement.
But how much of the change in housing deterioration can be ex-
plained by the presence of habitability laws? An econometric study of
the effect of receivership and repair and deduct laws covering thirty
SMSAs indicates that throughout 1960-75, receivership laws had statis-
tically significant effects on the shrinkage of substandard housing in an
SMSA, no matter how substandard is defined. 6 The broader the 1960
definition of substandard rental housing, the larger the shrinkage.
Thus, the net regression coefficient increases from 0.014 in terms of L,,
to 0.023 in terms of L2 , and to 0.033 in terms of L3 . The coefficient is
6 Hirsch & Law, Habitability Laws and the Shrinkage of Substandard Rental Housing Stock, 16
URB. STUD. 19-28 (1979).
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largest, at 0.046, when L is consistently defined as absence of plumbing
facilities. It makes sense that landlords would be less inclined to act in
accordance with a receivership law if their property was merely deterio-
rating, rather than dilapidated or lacking plumbing facilities.
A strict habitability law such as receivership imposes heavier costs
on landlords than do repair and deduct laws; therefore, it is more likely
to be honored. The empirical results are consistent with this hypothesis,
because in no case do repair and deduct laws have a statistically signifi-
cant effect on the shrinkage of substandard rental housing. That a re-
pair and deduct law, by its very nature, cannot induce landlords to
install plumbing facilities is confirmed by the regression results.
In conclusion, between 1960 and 1975, in the presence of receiver-
ship laws, the stock of substandard rental housing, ceteris paribus, de-
creased on the average 1.4% to 4.6%, depending on how "substandard"
is defined. Thus, habitability laws that were initially promulgated to
assist low income tenants rather than to contribute to shrinkage of sub-
standard housing in fact contribute more toward the latter.
II
RENT CONTROL
A. Welfare Effects
A major concern in the area of rent control relates to its effect on
rental prices and therefore on the distribution of benefits and costs. Al-
though rent control ordinances differ in detail, they all reduce the free-
dom of landlords to set rent levels. This commonality makes it possible
to analyze the effect of rent control on rental prices. Specifically, when
the cost of providing housing services increases, as it does particularly
during periods of inflation, rent control ordinances can prevent land-
lords from passing on part of these cost increases to tenants.
The imposition of rent control under such circumstances is
presented in Chart II. Specifically, the two axes are rent (R) and
number of dwellings (Q). Before the imposition of rent control, an equi-
librium number of dwelling units was Q and their rent was R,. For
example, as a result of increases in the price of input factors, whether
repair and maintenance costs, utilities, or property taxes, the supply
function shifts to the left from S, to S2 . Without a change in demand, a
new equilibrium would be reached as Q and R2. Rent control would
prohibit landlords from charging the rent they would otherwise have
sought. Thus, their rent will be below R2 . In the most extreme case,
where no rent increase is permitted, landlords would supply Q, minus
Q fewer dwellings than would be demanded in the short run. In the
long run, rent control is likely to have a chilling effect on investors and
therefore curtail the supply of housing. Thus, cumulative declines in
low cost
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CHART II
EFFECTS OF RENT-CONTROL LAW - SUPPLY ANALYSIS
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dwellings could be anticipated, accompanied by housing shortages.
Some empirical estimates have been obtained by C. Peter Rydell,
and others with him, who investigated the economic effects of the Los
Angeles rent control ordinance. 7 The analysis relies mainly on cross sec-
tion data from the Annual Housing Survey of the U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus. The findings are as follows: after controlling rents for about four
years, through May 1982, rents of controlled dwellings were estimated
to be about 4% lower than they would have been if rent control had not
been in force.8 Similarly, the price of rental housing services was esti-
mated to be 3.2% lower in May 1982, and the quantity of rental housing
services was 1.5% lower.
A temporal analysis indicated that rental housing services would
only slowly be restored after abolition of rent controls. Moreover, rent
control conferred its benefits early and extracted its costs late. The early
effects of rent control are exclusively price reductions, whereas, as time
passes, landlords reduce the level of rental housing services in line with
the rent they are permitted to charge.
7 C. RYDELL, C. BARNETTr, C. HILLESTAD, M. MURRAY, J. NEELS & R. SIMs, THE
IMPACT OF RENT CONTROL ON THE Los ANGELES HOUSING MARKET (1981) [hereinafter
cited as C. RYDELL].
8 Id at vi.
----3
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B. Effects on Deterioration of Housing Stock
Until recently, economists have paid little attention to the effects of
rent control laws on the quality of rental housing stock. The only two
major theoretical articles to address this problem are those by Mark
Frankena9 and John C. Moorhouse.10 A doctoral dissertation is now
being written by one of my students, David Mengle." He develops a
powerful analytical framework and has also begun to implement it. For
the empirical analysis, Mengle is using a sample of 6,500 tenants in eight
cities, four of which have rent control. He finds that, in 1974, the
probability of a rental dwelling failing the standards for satisfactory
dwellings (set by the Congressional Budget Office) was increased eight
percent by the presence of rent control laws.
The Rydell study also offers some empirical estimates of rent con-
trol induced housing deterioration. It estimated that each year eight
percent of the remaining relative price reduction caused by rent control
is converted into relative quantity reduction.12 Admittedly, this deterio-
ration depends on the size of rent reductions under the law, its specific
characteristics, and the economic environment.
Thus, rent control ordinances, even those designed especially to aid
low income groups, are often counterproductive. In the long run, they
are likely to hurt rather than help poor tenants. Whenever rent control
reduces rents below what they would be normally, housing service price
reductions result to the extent that they are not offset by quantity reduc-
tions. At the beginning, almost all of the rent reduction tends to go into
price reductions. Later, under-maintenance sets in, resulting in a reduc-
tion in housing service quantities and, therefore, deterioration. Price re-
ductions decline and are replaced by quantity reduction.
9 Frankena, Alternative Mode/s ofRent Control, 12 URB. STUD. 303-08 (1975).
10 Moorhouse, Optimal Housing Maintenance Under Rent Control, 39 S. EcON. J. 93-106
(1972).
11 D. Mengle, Rent Control and Housing Quality (unpublished manuscript).
12 C. RYDELL, supra note 7, at 82.
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